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Abstract 
According to the “1-in-X” effect, “1-in-X” ratios (e.g., 1 in 12) trigger a higher subjective 
probability than numerically equivalent “N-in-X*N” ratios (e.g., 3 in 36). Here we tested: (i) 
the effect on objective measures, (ii) its consequences for decision-making, (iii) whether this 
effect is a form of bias by measuring probability accuracy, and (iv) its amplification in people 
with lower health literacy and numeracy. In parallel-designed experiments, 975 participants 
from the general adult population participated in one of five experiments following a 
2(format: “1-in-X” or “N-in-X*N”) × 4(scenarios) mixed design. Participants assessed the 
risk of contracting a disease on either a verbal probability scale (Exp. 1), or a numerical 
probability/frequency scale with immediate (Exp. 2-3) or delayed presentation (Exp. 4-5). 
Participants also made a health-related decision and completed a health literacy and 
numeracy scale. The “1-in-X” ratios yielded higher probability perceptions than the “N-in-
X*N” ratios and affected relevant decisions. Critically, the “1-in-X” ratios led to a larger 
objective overestimation of numerical probabilities than the “N-in-X*N” ratios. People with 
lower levels of health literacy and numeracy were not more sensitive to the bias. Health 
professionals should use “1-in-X” ratios with great caution when communicating to patients, 
because they overestimate health risks.  
Keywords: “1-in-X” effect, bias, health risk communication, health literacy, numeracy   
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Public Significance Statement 
In five experiments, we present evidence that people incorrectly interpret “1-in-X” ratios 
(e.g., 1 in 13) as conveying a higher probability than the numerically equivalent “N-in-X*N” 
ratios (e.g., 10 in 130), and that this effect is due to an overestimation of “1-in-X” ratios. 
Health professionals should use “1-in-X” ratios with caution since these ratios might make 
patients to overestimate health risks, and to make ill-informed decisions as a result.   
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The accurate perception and understanding of probabilistic information is the 
cornerstone of well-informed medical decisions and health-related behaviour change (e.g., 
Lipkus, 2007). To facilitate such accurate perception and understanding, prior research 
focused on optimising the communication of probabilistic health information (e.g., Fagerlin, 
Ubel, Smith, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2007a; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & 
Woloshin, 2007; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014a), 
while taking into account individual differences such as numerical and graphical literacy 
(e.g., Gaissmaier et al., 2012; Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009). In the present 
paper, we have contributed to this research programme by documenting the probability 
perception of health risks when communicated using “1-in-X” (e.g., “1 chance in 13”) and 
“N-in-X*N” (e.g., “10 chances in 130”) ratios. We have assessed the systematic departure 
from correct probability estimates that these formats generate when communicated to people 
with different levels of health literacy and numeracy. 
“1-in-X” effect or “1-in-X” bias? 
According to the “1-in-X” effect, people perceive “1-in-X” ratios to be more likely 
than “N-in-X*N” ratios (Pighin et al., 2011). For example, 1 chance in 13 is perceived as 
greater than 10 chances in 130, even though the probability is numerically the same. This 
effect is robust as it occurs across different education levels, cultures and outcomes (Pighin et 
al., 2011; Pighin et al., 2015; Sirota, Juanchich, Kostopoulou, & Hanak, 2014). The “1-in-X” 
effect runs counter to the ratio bias effect (Yamagishi, 1997), according to which people 
neglect the denominator of fractions expressing probabilities (Bonner & Newell, 2008; 
Denesraj et al., 1995; Galesic et al., 2009; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Okan, Garcia‐
Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2012). One critical difference between the two literatures 
is that ratio biases are typically obtained when people are presented with two ratios jointly, 
and asked to make a comparative judgment; whereas the “1-in-X” effect is typically obtained 
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when people are presented with ratios separately, and asked to make an absolute magnitude 
judgment. Since health providers and consumers are often required to understand probability 
and frequency information using an absolute magnitude judgment, we have focused on such 
absolute judgments in this paper. 
What we do not know yet about the “1-in-X” effect, although it is critical, is whether 
the effect is actually a form of bias, that is, an inaccurate distortion of probability perception, 
leading to suboptimal decisions. In other words, we do not know what the source of the 
probability distortion is: “1-in-X” format or the other formats to which researchers usually 
compared to “1-in-X”. Indeed, the fact that “1-in-X” ratios increase the magnitude of 
subjective probability judgments – measured in prior research exclusively on Likert scales 
using verbal probability expressions – does not logically entail that these judgments are 
inaccurate: they could actually be better calibrated (i.e., closer to the “true” objective 
probability of an event). Establishing whether or not the “1-in-X” effect is a form of bias is 
important for at least three related reasons.  
First, there have been some recent calls to retire the “1-in-X” formats from health risk 
communication (Zikmund-Fisher, 2011, 2014). Even though such calls rely on the fact that 
the format change is cost-free and therefore easy to implement, they implicitly assume that 
the “1-in-X” effect is distorting probability perception. The supporting evidence for such 
claims is so far indirect. For instance, it seems that “1-in-X” ratios are not only subjectively 
higher than “N-in-X*N” ratios, but are also systematically higher compared with other 
formats such as percentages or pictorial representations (Pighin et al., 2011; Sirota, 
Juanchich, Kostopoulou, & Hanak, 2014b). Nevertheless, to fully justify the calls to 
withdraw “1-in-X” ratios from medical practice, we need more direct evidence of the 
inaccuracy of “1-in-X” probability perceptions.   
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 Second, “1-in-X” ratios are highly prevalent in health communication (Sirota et al., 
2017). For example, family physicians overwhelmingly prefer to communicate prenatal risks 
using “1-in-X” ratios (80.4%) when compared to alternative numerical formats (e.g., 3.8% 
cases of “N-in-X*N” format). Also, the UK’s National Health Service mostly uses “1-in-X” 
ratios to convey medical information to patients on its website: 45.7% cases conveyed in the 
“1-in-X” compared with 13.7% cases conveyed in the “N-in-X*N” format (Sirota et al., 
2017). This high prevalence can magnify even small inaccuracy effects, and amplify the po-
tential to bias patients’ judgment and decision-making, which underlies the urgency of the 
recent calls to abandon “1-in-X” ratios.  
Third, we know that people with lower levels of health literacy and numeracy (i.e., 
the ability and disposition to understand and use numerical health information) are more 
prone to various cognitive biases, which impair their ability to engage in informed and shared 
health decision-making (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011; Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2009; Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Kaphingst et al., 2015; Okan, Garcia‐
Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2012; Peters, 2012; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 
2009; Reyna, 2008). Accordingly, we need to assess whether people with lower health 
literacy and numeracy levels might be differentially affected by a “1-in-X” bias, with 
amplified consequences on their health-related decision-making. 
The Present Experiments 
In this paper, we have reported five experiments which aim to systematically 
investigate the impact of the “1-in-X” format on probability perception accuracy. To do so, 
we used several response scales, including numerical scales which allow for an objective 
measure of accuracy, in contrast with the verbal probability scales used in prior research 
which only reflected variations in subjective probabilities. Using these numerical scales 
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allows us to assess inaccuracy, but this comes at a price: instead of simply perceiving an 
event as more or less likely, as they would when they are told about medical risk, participants 
may try to conduct a precise mathematical calculation to translate this risk correctly onto the 
numerical scale. To tap into the same psychological processes as those involved in producing 
the “1-in-X” effect using verbal probability scales, we introduced several strategies to avoid 
precise calculation. First, we simply instructed participants not to precisely calculate the 
answers. Second, we used ratios for which numerical values are not easily calculated (e.g., “1 
in 13” rather than “1 in 10”). Third, we designed variants of the experiment in which the 
estimation of the objective probability is delayed to a subsequent screen, instead of being 
presented together with the ratio. Finally, we asked participants whether they had calculated 
their answer, to be able to control statistically for this possibility. 
In five experiments, we investigated four research questions. First, we investigated 
whether the “1-in-X” effect would be observed across the different scales (verbal, frequency 
and probability scales) and different procedures (immediate or delayed presentation of the 
scale), allowing for differences in the magnitude of the effect across scales and procedures 
(Question 1). Second, we investigated whether the “1-in-X” effect would affect decisions, in 
addition to subjective probability judgments (Question 2). Third, and most importantly, we 
tested whether judgments based on the “1-in-X” format would be more biased – i.e. show 
greater deviations from the objectively correct value than judgments based on the “N-in-
X*N” format (Question 3). Fourth, we tested whether people with lower health literacy and 
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The stopping rule for the required number of participants was determined a priori to 
avoid possible increased false-positive rates (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012). Based on 
a power analysis, we aimed to recruit at least 90 participants in each condition of the five 
experiments (i.e., at least 180 participants in each experiment, 900 participants overall). Such 
a sample size would allow us to detect at least a medium effect size, Cohen’s d = 0.42 (an 
overall meta-analytical effect detected in the prior literature, see Sirota et al., 2014b), when 
assuming α = .05, 1 - β = .80, and a conservative two-sided t-test (Cohen, 1988). We 
increased the sample size by 10% to account for a possible attrition rate.  
As a result, 1,003 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers completed the online 
questionnaire and were rewarded with $1 for their participation. The data from 28 people was 
removed based on a priori exclusion criteria – self-reported careless responding, when the 
participants indicated “no” to the question: “Lastly, it is vital to our study that we only 
include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. You will receive 
your reward for participation in this study no matter what, however, please tells us: In your 
honest opinion, should we use your data in our analyses in this study?” (Meade & Craig, 
2012). Participants knew that their answer would not affect the financial compensation for 
their participation.  
The final sample of 975 participants (54.7% males, age range from 18 to 74 years, M 
= 35.0, SD = 11.2) took part in one of five experiments. The sample was heterogeneous in 
terms of occupation: management and professionals (22.2%), unemployed, students and 
homemakers (19.3%), sales and office (17.8%), other categories (16.4%), service (12.4%) 
and some other less common occupations such as government-workers or those involved in 
the farming industry. Participants had different education levels: 0.5% did not complete their 
high school education, 30.8% achieved high school education, 56.5% achieved a college 
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degree, 10.2% achieved a master’s degree and 2.1% achieved a PhD or other professional 
degree. 
Design 
Five experiments were carried out using a parallel design (e.g., Sirota, Kostovičová, 
& Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015). As shown in Figure 1, participants were first allocated 
randomly to one of the five experiments, and then allocated randomly to one of the two 
experimental format conditions within that experiment (“1-in-X” vs. “N-in-X*N” ). In each 
format condition, participants read four scenarios focusing on the risks of contracting 
different diseases that had different probability magnitudes; the presentation order of the 
scenarios was randomised for each participant. We chose to use a parallel design for three 
reasons. First, this design allowed us to test our questions using a variation of the response 
scales, whilst allowing us to analyse the results of each experiment individually. Second, we 
chose this design because we planned to conduct a small-scale meta-analysis and this design 
allowed us to avoid an arbitrary stopping rule for the number of included experiments that 
could inflate the chances of a type I error (Ueno, Fastrich, & Murayama, 2016). Third, this 
parallel design allowed us to draw direct causal claims about the variables manipulated across 
the experiments.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Figure 1 around here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Materials and Procedure 
After giving informed consent and random allocation to conditions (Figure 1), 
participants were instructed to express their intuitions about the probability of some events, 
rather than a calculated mathematical response. Then, participants read four scenarios about 
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the risk of contracting a disease whilst travelling abroad (with a random order of presentation 
for each participant). For instance, one scenario described the risk of being infected by 
malaria whilst travelling to Kenya: “Imagine that you have booked a trip to Kenya and now 
you learn that the risk of being infected by malaria during your trip to Kenya is [1 in 13 / 7 in 
91]”. The remaining three scenarios described travel to Sierra Leone, Norway and Slovakia 
and featured risk magnitudes for Ebola, the flu and Lyme disease, respectively (see Table 1). 
Different probability ratios were selected with the condition that they would not be easy to 
calculate (as it would be, for example, if the risk was 1 in 10). The scenarios are presented in 
the Appendix. The order of presentation of the scenarios was randomised. 
In all of the scenarios, participants assessed the probability of contracting the illness: 
(“In your opinion, the probability of being infected by malaria during your trip to Kenya is 
…”) on a scale that differed across experiments. In Exp. 1 (verbal probability scale), 
participants ticked one of the buttons of an 11-point Likert scale anchored with verbal 
quantifiers (1: extremely low, 11: extremely high). In Exp. 2 (numerical probability scale), 
participants selected their answer on a visual analogue probability scale ranging from 0 to 
100 with increments of 1. The scale had 11 numerical labels (0, 10, 20 … ) and moving the 
cursor on the slider showed the exact numerical value (e.g., 26). In Exp. 3 (numerical 
frequency scale), participants selected their response on a visual analogue frequency scale 
ranging from 0 to 286 by increments of 1. The scale had 11 labels (0, 29, 57 … ) and moving 
the cursor on the slider enabled participants to see the exact value (e.g., 26). In Exp. 4 
(delayed numerical probability scale), the same numerical probability scale was used as in 
Exp. 2, however the scale was presented on a subsequent page, hence its presentation was 
delayed. In Exp. 5 (delayed frequency probability scale), the same numerical frequency scale 
was used as in Exp. 3, however the scale was presented on a subsequent page, hence its 
presentation was delayed. 
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After they had assessed the probability of contracting the disease in the scenario, 
participants reported whether they calculated the answer (“Did you calculate the answer to 
the previous question?”; note this was only asked in Exp. 2-5) and decided whether they 
would take action to remedy the risk. (“Given this risk, how likely are you to cancel your trip 
to Kenya?”) This was done by ticking a radio button on a 6-point Likert scale (1: unlikely to 
cancel, 6: likely to cancel). After answering all the scenarios, participants rated how easy it 
was to assess the risks. (“How difficult was it to map the risks associated with the travelling 
expressed as ratios on the provided response scale?”) This was done using a 5-point Likert 
scale (ranging from 1: very easy to 5: very difficult). 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Table 1 around here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Next, participants filled in a brief measure of health literacy and numeracy. The health 
literacy measure – The Newest Vital Sign (Weiss et al., 2005) – consisted of the nutritional 
label for an ice-cream accompanied by six open-ended questions (e.g., “If you eat the entire 
container, how many calories will you eat?”) for which the answers were coded either as 
correct or incorrect. This measure was selected because it correlates highly with well-
established measures of literacy and it is quick and simple to perform (Weiss et al., 2005). 
The internal consistency of the sum score was acceptable although low (Cronbach’s α = 
0.52). The Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007b; McNaughton, Cavanaugh, 
Kripalani, Rothman, & Wallston, 2015) consisted of three questions (e.g., “How good are 
you at working with fractions?”) assessed on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1: not good 
at all to 6: extremely good. The average score had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 
0.83). We used both measures separately because their correlation was relatively small, r = 
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0.24, indicating that they do not measure the same construct. Other authors adopted a similar 
approach (e.g., Rodríguez et al., 2013). 
Finally, participants recorded some basic socio-demographic information (i.e., age, 
gender, education and occupation). The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical 
standards of the American Psychological Association. The project was approved by the Eth-
ics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Essex. We have reported all 
experiments, measures, manipulations and exclusions here. The data are publicly available on 




Does the “1-in-X” effect alter probability perception? (Question 1) 
We observed the “1-in-X” effect as a general pattern: the “1-in-X” ratios received 
greater magnitude than the “N-in-X*N” ratios. The effect was observed quite consistently 
across different scenarios and experiments (Figure 2). Clearly, the effect was more 
pronounced with the verbal probability scales (Exp. 1) and less so with the numerical scales 
(Exp. 2-5, Figure 2, panel E). To simplify the presentation of the results, we averaged the 
probability and frequency across the four scenarios in each experiment. (This was reasonable, 
because a mixed ANOVA showed a significant effect of the ratios format but no interaction 
between the scenarios and ratios format.)  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Figure 2 around here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Running Head: ACCURACY OF 1-in-X FORMAT 
13 
In Exp. 1 (verbal probability scale), the “1-in-X” ratios led to significantly higher 
probabilities than the “N-in-X*N” ratios, F(1, 190) = 19.4, p < .001, µp
2
 = 0.09. In Exp. 2 
(numerical probability scale), the “1-in-X” ratios led to a higher probability than the “N-in-
X*N” ratios, but not significantly so, F(1, 197) = 0.4, p = .532, µp
2
 = 0.002 and this did not 
change after controlling for the calculation covariate, F(1,195) = 0.6, p = .423. In Exp. 3 
(numerical frequency scale), the “1-in-X” ratios led to a higher probability than the “N-in-
X*N” ratios, but not significantly so, F(1, 188) = 1.1, p = .297, µp
2
 = 0.01 and did not change 
after controlling for the calculation covariate, F(1,186) = 1.1, p = .305. In Exp. 4 (delayed 
numerical probability scale), the “1-in-X” ratios led to a higher probability than the “N-in-
X*N” ratios and the difference was statistically significant, F(1, 194) = 5.9, p = .016, µp
2
 = 
0.03, and did not change after controlling for the calculation covariate, F(1,192) = 5.7, p = 
0.017. Finally, in Exp. 5 (delayed numerical frequency scale), the “1-in-X” ratios led to a 
higher probability than the “N-in-X*N” ratios but the difference was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 191) = 1.2, p = .284, µp
2
 = 0.01, and did not change after controlling for the 
calculation covariate, F(1,192) = 0.9, p = .354. 
Thus, the direction of the effect was consistently replicated, but the findings were 
mixed in terms of statistical significance. To better assess the overall effect of the “1-in-X” 
ratio, we conducted a meta-analysis on the aggregated data using a random effect model. We 
found that the overall “1-in-X” meta-analytical effect was g = 0.27, 95% CI[0.08, 0.47], z = 
2.8, p = .005. The scale was a significant moderator in a random effect model, g = -0.44, 95% 
CI [-0.75, -.14], QM(1) = 7.9, p = .005. The effect was more pronounced for the verbal 
probability scale, g = 0.63, 95% CI[0.35, 0.91]), compared with the numerical scales, g = 
0.19, 95% CI[0.05, 0.32], but the overall effect across the four numerical scale experiments 
was still significant, z = 2.6, p = .009. Thus, we replicated the “1-in-X” effect for the 
numerical as well as for the verbal scales. 
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Does the “1-in-X” effect alter decision-making? (Question 2) 
Participants in the “1-in-X” condition were more likely to take a safety measure to 
reduce the risk (i.e., cancel their trip, Figure 3). In Exp. 1 (verbal probability scale), 
participants in the “1-in-X” condition were significantly more likely to cancel their trip, F(1, 
190) = 5.6, p = .019, µp
2
 = 0.03. In Exp. 2 (numerical probability scale ), 3 (numerical 
frequency scale) and 4 (delayed numerical probability scale), participants in the “1-in-X” 
condition were slightly more likely to cancel their trip, but the effect was not significant, F(1, 
198) = 0.2, p = .678, µp
2
 < 0.01, F(1, 189) = 0.1, p = .827, µp
2
 < 0.01, F(1, 196) = 0.4, p = 
.515, µp
2
 < 0.01, respectively.  In Exp. 5 (delayed numerical frequency scale), participants in 
the “1-in-X” condition were significantly more likely to cancel their trip, F(1, 192) = 4.6, p = 
.034, µp
2
 = 0.02. We summarised the effect on decision-making through a meta-analysis of 
the aggregated data using a random effect model. We found that the overall “1-in-X” meta-
analytical effect on decision-making was small but significant, g = 0.17, 95% CI[0.04, 0.29], 
z = 2.5, p = .012 (Figure 3, panel F). 
Is the “1-in-X” effect an overestimation bias? (Question 3) 
To assess objective accuracy (Exp. 2 to 5) we transformed the answers given on the 
frequency scales into probability (0-100%) scales and then calculated the distance from the 
objective value for each estimate. For example, a deviation of 0 meant that the answer was 
perfectly aligned with the objective value, a deviation of -5 meant that a participant 
underestimated the objective value by a magnitude of 5 percentage points, and a deviation of 
+ 5 meant that a participant overestimated the objective value by a magnitude of 5 percentage 
points.  
Overall, across all the scenarios and experiments, participants were less accurate in 
the “1-in-X” condition, overestimating the objective value by 6.0 percentage points (SD = 
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17.1), compared to an overestimation of 3.5 points in the “N-in-X*N” condition (SD = 14.3). 
The trend to overestimate was consistent across all scenarios (Figure 4). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Figure 4 around here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
For statistical inference, we used a multi-level modelling approach, which allowed us 
to explicitly model other relevant variables (e.g., adjusting for calculation, health literacy, 
numeracy) and their interactions with ratios, which would not be possible in a meta-analytical 
approach. Through an iterative process, the final model featured ratio and scenario as fixed 
factors and random intercepts within experiments, scenarios and subjects. (We removed the 
full random structure due to convergence problems; we also removed the interaction between 
the fixed effects of ratio and scenario from the final model, since comparing the model with 
and without interaction yielded a non-significant difference, χ2(3) = 2.45, p = .484). In this 
final model, we found a significant effect of ratio, F(1, 777.72) = 6.1, p = .014, and a 
significant effect of scenario, F(3, 2341.30) = 25.6, p < .001. Critically, both the “1-in-X” 
and “N-in-X*N” ratios were not perfectly accurate, since the intercept was 7.0 and “N-in-
X*N” decreased this in accuracy by 2.2 points.  
We then tested whether such a bias might have occurred due to performing actual 
calculations and/or subjective perception (ease) of ratios. The random intercept model 
reported above was adjusted for the self-reported measure of calculation and the interaction 
with the ratio. In this extended model, the observed effect of the ratio remained the same and 
the calculation did not affect the deviation, b = 0.8, F(1, 2956.9) = 1.0, p = .317; nor did it 
interact with the ratio format, b < 0.1, F(1, 2965.5) < 0.1, p = .996. In a similar way, we did 
not observe any effect of ratio format on the self-reported ease. Across the four experiments 
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featuring a numerical scale, the subjective ease was virtually the same in the “1-in-X” 
condition (M = 2.4, SD = 1.0) as in the “N-in-X*N” condition (M = 2.4, SD = 1.0). We found 
no significant effect of ratio on the subjective ease, b < 0.1, F(1, 194.99) = 0.03, p = .864, in 
a multi-level model with ratio as the fixed factor, with a random intercept and slope within 
the experiments. Thus, the effect of the ratio format on inaccuracy could not be attributed to 
the different objective calculation requirements of the ratios nor to the subjective perception 
of computation difficulty. 
Are people with lower health literacy and numeracy levels more prone to the “1-in-X” 
bias? (Question 4) 
Finally, we wanted to identify the role of health literacy (M = 5.0, SD = 1.2, max = 6) 
and numeracy (M = 4.5, SD = 1.1, max = 6) might play in the propensity for the “1-in-X” 
bias. We used the same multi-level model with ratio and scenario as fixed factors and added 
heath literacy and numeracy and their interaction into the model. Literacy was substantially 
negatively skewed (-1.28) and to improve its skewness the score was reflected, 
logarithmically transformed and reflected back (final skewness was improved -0.41). Both 
variables were then mean-centered for better interpretability. According to the final random-
intercept model, we found the same patterns regarding our main fixed factors: a significant 
intercept, b0 = 7.2, t(3.8) = 4.3, p = .015 and a significant effect of ratio, F(1, 771.68) = 6.6, p 
= .010 and scenario, F(3, 2341.34) = 25.6, p < .001. Health literacy and subjective numeracy 
significantly and substantially decreased deviation by b = -11.8 points, F(1, 773.32) = 33.3, p 
< .001 and by b =  -1.76 points, F(1, 771.60) = -3.1, p = .002, respectively. However, health 
literacy, b = 1.9, F(1, 772.06) = 0.3, p = .617, subjective numeracy, b = 1.2, F(1, 772.93) = 
2.2, p = .140, or both, b = -4.3, F(1, 772.15) = 1.7, p = .199, did not interact with ratio 
manipulation. Thus, even though more health-literate and numerate participants were less 
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likely to overestimate the objective probabilities, they were not any less sensitive to the “1-in-
X” bias.  
Discussion 
Across the five experiments reported here, we found that the “1-in-X” format 
increased perceived probability compared with the “N-in-X*N” format, not only when 
participants provided their perceptions on a verbal probability scale but also on numerical 
probability and frequency scales. While the effect was smaller for the numerical scales, it was 
reliable, being directionally replicated across the four experiments featuring a numerical 
scale, and detected as significant in a meta-analysis. This finding thus replicates and extends 
the prior research on the “1-in-X” effect (Oudhoff & Timmermans, 2015; Pighin et al., 2011; 
Sirota et al., 2014b). It is also consistent with the findings that responses provided on 
numerical scales are less prone to biases than on verbal ones (Windschitl & Weber, 1999). 
Clearly, participants’ answers are more constrained by numerical scales, perhaps because 
they offer the possibility to provide the correct answer. Another noteworthy finding was the 
overall “1-in-X” effect on related decision making. Despite the fact that the “1-in-X” effect 
on probability was small, it was still strong enough to affect the involved decisions. 
Critically, when using numerical scales, our participants systematically overestimated 
numerical probabilities/frequencies expressed in a “1-in-X” format (compared with their 
objective value). Therefore, we can conclude that the “1-in-X” effect is a form of bias, 
leading to higher overestimation of numerical quantities relative to the “N-in-X*N” ratios. 
Our findings provide direct evidence for such a bias, the existence of which was only 
indirectly supported by prior research showing that the “1-in-X” format resulted in a higher 
subjective probability when compared with other formats such as “N-in-X*N”, percentages 
or visual representations (Oudhoff & Timmermans, 2015; Pighin et al., 2011; Sirota et al., 
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2014b). Evidence that the “1-in-X” effect is a form of bias, along with the finding that the “1-
in-X” ratios also affected decision-making, provides more support for the recommendation to 
eliminate the “1-in-X” format when communicating health risks to patients (Zikmund-Fisher, 
2011, 2014). The “1-in-X” bias, however, is not dependent on levels of health literacy or 
numeracy. This means that people with lower numeracy/health literacy skills are not more 
sensitive to this particular format variation. Such a finding also points towards a different root 
of the bias than lack of numeracy or difficulties interpreting health information, which are 
traditionally assumed to be behind probability biases. For example, individuals with lower 
numeracy skills have been shown to be less sensitive than more numerate individuals to 
variations in denominators (Ghazal, Cokely, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Reyna & Brainerd, 
2008).  
A few limitations of the current studies need to be discussed. First, we need to 
consider the possibility that the “1-in-X” bias is a methodological artefact. One might argue, 
for instance, that different calculation requirements of the ratios might have caused the “1-in-
X” bias. However, we do not think the “1-in-X” bias can be explained via this mechanism. 
First, it is hard to consider that a ratio of 1 in 7 would be much harder to compute than 10 in 
70. Hence, if participants – despite our request to estimate the numbers rather than calculate 
them – failed in a process of calculation, then one would expect the opposite effect: to 
perform worse with the ratios containing higher numbers (10 in 70) rather than lower 
numbers (1 in 7). Such miscalculation, furthermore, fails to explain why the bias would occur 
with verbal probabilities, as we have seen in Exp. 1 and elsewhere (Pighin et al., 2011; Sirota 
et al., 2014b). In our data, self-reported attempts to calculate answers did not interact with the 
ratios, in fact, they did not change the accuracy of the estimates. 
Second, we have measured decision-making using a continuous measure rather than 
an actual choice task. As such, the effect of the ratio on the decision-making scale can be 
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considered as proof of concept rather than an estimation of clinical significance. Even though 
we know that the “1-in-X” ratios are very prevalent in clinical practice (Sirota et al., 2017), 
we are still lacking information on how important the effect is in clinical terms. Future 
research may, in particular, focus on establishing clinical significance using ecologically 
valid materials, and map the effect on actual dichotomous decisions. Finally, future research 
should also try to explain the mechanism underlying the effect and test the suggestions of 
other authors, e.g., gist interpretation (Zikmund-Fisher, 2014), severity overestimation by 
association (Sirota et al., 2017), or ease of imagination (Oudhoff & Timmermans, 2015). In 
this respect, identifying the boundary conditions through which the effect is occurring could 
shed more light on the mechanisms as well. 
To conclude, we extended the “1-in-X” effect on medical probabilities to numerical 
estimation scales, which allowed us to establish that the “1-in-X” effect was really a form of 
bias and a source of objective mistakes, impeding informed decision-making, although 
people with lower levels of health literacy and numeracy did not show increased vulnerability 
to this effect. The evidence we have provided strongly suggests that risk communication 
theories should not assume different ratio formats to be able to communicate risk as 
effectively, and that risk communicators should be especially cautious when using “1-in-X” 
ratios. 
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Table 1  
 
Scenarios used in Exp. 1-5 with the focal disease, conveyed risk and ratio format.  
Scenario Disease Risk Ratio “1-in-X” vs. “N-in-X*N” 
Kenya Malaria 7.69% 1 in 13 vs. 7 in 91 
Sierra Leone Ebola 1.20% 1 in 83 vs. 2 in 166 
Norway Flu 14.29% 1 in 7 vs. 10 in 70 
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Figure 1. Design of five parallel experiments and designs within each experiment. 
Note. Scenario 1 (Kenya), Scenario 2 (Sierra Leone), Scenario 3 (Norway), Scenario 4 (Slo-
vakia). The presentation order of the scenarios was randomised. 
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Figure 2. Effect of the ratios’ formats (“1-in-X” vs. “N-in-X*N”) on the perceived 
probability: Verbal probability scale (panel A), numerical probability scale (panel B), 
numerical frequency scale (panel C), delayed numerical probability scale (panel D), delayed 
numerical frequency scale (panel E) and the internal meta-analysis of the effect on 
aggregated data across all scales (panel F). 
Note. The middle bars represent the mean and the boxes represent 95% CIs. Scenario 1 
(Kenya), Scenario 2 (Sierra Leone), Scenario 3 (Norway) and Scenario 4 (Slovakia). 
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Figure 3. Effect of the ratios’ formats (“1-in-X” vs. “N-in-X*N”) on related decision-
making: Verbal probability scale (panel A), numerical probability scale (panel B), numerical 
frequency scale (panel C), delayed numerical probability scale (panel D), delayed numerical 
frequency scale (panel E) and the internal meta-analysis of the effect on aggregated data 
across all scales (panel F). 
Note. The middle bars represent the mean and the boxes represent 95% CIs. Scenario 1 




Running Head: ACCURACY OF 1-in-X FORMAT 
29 
 
Figure 4. Effect of the ratios’ formats (“1-in-X” vs. “N-in-X*N”) on the accuracy (deviation 
on a probability scale; 0 represents perfect accuracy) across four scenarios (aggregated across 
Exp. 2-5).  
Note. The middle points represent the mean and the bars represent ±1 SE. Scenario 1 
(Kenya), Scenario 2 (Sierra Leone), Scenario 3 (Norway) and Scenario 4 (Slovakia). 
